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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The ease of enforcement is often cited as a benefit of the cap-and-
trade regulatory approach.  Cap-and-trade programs have been credited 
with having a “far simpler enforcement system” than traditional air 
pollution regulation, with 100% compliance achievable “with virtually no 
enforcement effort.”1  It has been said that all an environmental agency 
needed to do once a cap-and-trade program is legislated into existence, is to 
“set up the reporting and accounting system needed to ensure adequate 
enforcement”—a task that is “much less demanding and time-consuming” 
than writing regulations for traditional environmental regulation.2  
Governmental administration costs for cap-and-trade are reportedly lower 
than for traditional regulation, and the relationship between regulators and 
regulated entities is less conflict-ridden.3 
1. Byron Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities,
NAT. RES. & ENVTL., May-Aug. 2005, at 5. 
2. Denny Ellerman, Are Cap and Trade Programs More Environmentally
Effective than Conventional Regulation?, in M OVING TO M ARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 52 (Jody Freeman & 
Charles D. Kolstad, eds., 2007). 
3. Swift, supra note 2, at 5, 7. See also Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain
Program: Key Insights from the Design, Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade 
Program, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 51 (2007) (stating that the flexibility of cap-and-trade 
regulation “minimizes the administrative costs”); id. at 57 (discussing how regulators can 
create a cooperative relationship with industry in a cap-and-trade program). 
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Many of these assertions have been made in the context of discussions 
about the Acid Rain Program (ARP), a cap-and-trade program that 
began in the mid-1990s to reduce the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from 
the nation’s power plants.4  However, another cap-and-trade program 
established at about the same time with enforcement provisions modeled 
after the ARP tells a very different story.  In the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program, designed to reduce the emissions 
of precursors to smog in Los Angeles, enforcement turned out to be  
very burdensome for the government.  From the point of view of the 
environmental agency that administered the program, “an unanticipated 
consequence of RECLAIM was the enormous amount of resources it 
takes to adequately monitor and enforce compliance.”5 
This Article uses the histories of the ARP and RECLAIM to show that 
even when monitoring and enforcement provisions for cap-and-trade 
programs are designed in a similar way,6 the resulting enforcement 
systems and enforcement outcomes may be very different.  Part I of the 
article tells the enforcement story of the ARP.  It appears to be a story of 
regulatory efficiency and success.   Part II tells the enforcement story of 
RECLAIM. While not a failure, RECLAIM enforcement seems to have been 
full of difficulties that necessitated large amounts of administrative time 
and resources.  This part presents the results of an empirical analysis of 
RECLAIM enforcement actions from 1994 through 2006. The analysis 
shows that RECLAIM had many more enforcement actions than the 
ARP, despite the fact that the ARP was a much larger cap-and-trade 
program in terms of the volume of pollution regulated.  Similarly, the 
amount of monetary penalties assessed in RECLAIM for non-
compliance was much larger than the amount assessed in the ARP. 
 4. See, e.g., Ellerman, supra note 3; Swift, supra note 1; Dallas Burtraw & Byron 
Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain 
Program, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,411, at 10,421–22 (1996) (stating that that the program’s 
“compliance mechanism is open and straightforward, and together with the Act’s penalty 
provisions, create an almost self-executing enforcement system,” and further stating that 
“there has been virtually 100 percent compliance . . . with little need for enforcement action”). 
 5. S. COAST AIR QUALITY M GMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN YEARS OF RECLAIM  
IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-
AND-TRADE PROGRAM I-3-6 (2007) [hereinafter OVER A DOZEN YEARS OF RECLAIM], 
available at http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/docs/Policy_Paper_Part1.pdf. 
 6. Cf. John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chávez & Barry C. Field, Enforcing 
Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance, 30 POL’Y STUD. J. 
343, 348 (2002) (stating that “the monitoring strategies of the SO2 and RECLAIM 
programs are quite similar”). 
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II.  THE ENFORCEMENT STORY OF THE ARP 
The ARP is viewed as a very successful environmental regulatory 
program.7  It was created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and it 
is administered by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
The program began in 1995 by regulating the emissions of the country’s 
largest coal-fired combustion units, and it expanded significantly in 2000 
to include gas- and oil-fired combustion units.8 Commentators have 
particularly lauded the program’s achievements in compliance and 
enforcement: the program has achieved almost 100% compliance and it 
did so using sophisticated technology that facilitated the collection, 
transmission, and verification of compliance.9  Like the story of the 
program itself, the ARP’s enforcement story is one of success and 
efficiency. 
A.  Continuous Electronic Verification 
In the ARP, the EPA forged a system of self-monitoring and 
enforcement that relied heavily on technology.  The EPA required 
many of the regulated sources to install costly emissions monitoring 
technologies that provide continuous data.10 The EPA then developed 
sophisticated information technology systems through which the data could 
be transmitted and analyzed.11  The result was an “electronic verification” 
 7. See, e.g., Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 47 David Harrison et al., Using 
Emissions Trading to Combat Climate Change: Programs and Key Issues, 38 ENVTL. L. 
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,367, 10,370 (2008); Swift, supra note 1, at 3. 
 8. The EPA defines a “unit” as a fossil fuel-fired combustor that serves a 
generator that provides electricity for sale. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACID RAIN 
PROGRAM 2004 PROGRESS REPORT, EPA 430-R-05-012 5 (2005), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2004report.pdf [hereinafter ACID RAIN PROGRAM 
REPORT 2004]. The original 263 units included in Phase I of the program were located in 
110 electricity generation facilities.  A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., M ARKETS FOR CLEAN 
AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 6 (2000), available at http://catdir.loc.gov/ 
catdir/samples/cam032/99016913.pdf. Phase I also included a number of “substitution 
units,” bringing the total number of units participating in the first year of the program to 
445 (see Table 1 infra p. ).  Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in 
Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 396, 434 (2009). 
See infra Table 1 for the number of units participating in the program in the years 1995 
through 2007. 
 9. Swift, supra note 1, at 4. 
 10. Blas Pérez Henríquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of Market-
Based Environmental Policies, RESOURCES, Fall/Winter 2004, at 11 (citing an average 
annual cost of about $124,000 per unit). 
 11. Joe Kruger & Christian Egenhofer, Confidence Through Compliance in 
Emissions Trading Markets, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L & POL’Y 2, 5 (2006) (on “Extensive 
Use of Information Technology”). 
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system that largely avoided the need for the agency to conduct field 
inspections to verify self-reported data. 
The ARP featured very detailed monitoring and reporting rules.  The 
“Part 75” rules number several hundred pages, setting forth the requirements 
about how a unit subject to the program must register with the EPA, 
select a monitoring technology, install and certify monitoring systems, 
monitor and record emissions data, conduct quality assurance/quality control 
procedures, maintain records, and report emissions.12  EPA has also 
developed an online policy manual about ARP monitoring and reporting 
requirements that is about five-hundred pages long and is continually 
updated.13 
The program’s largest polluters, namely the coal-fired power plants, 
were required to install Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems 
(CEMS).14  CEMS are “electromechanical instruments that sample, analyze, 
measure, and record” emissions information that are installed in the smoke 
stack through which emissions pass.15  A “data acquisition and handling 
system” records all data from the monitoring systems, translates it into 
the required units of measure, and stores the data.  Overall, about 36% of 
regulated units were required to use CEMS, covering about 96% of 
emissions.16 
Gas- and oil-fired plants are allowed to use alternative methods based 
on measurements of their fuel usage.17  For most such units, the rules 
require that there be continuous monitoring of the fuel flow rate and 
periodic sampling of the fuel characteristics, such as sulfur content and 
12. Joseph Kruger, Companies and Regulators in Emissions Trading Programs, in
EMISSIONS TRADING: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DECISION MAKING AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 
3, 12 (Ralf Antes, Bernd Hansjürgens, Peter Letmathe, eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-05-03.pdf. See also CLEAN AIR M ARKETS DIV.,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE PART 75 RULE 8–17 (2009), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/docs/plain_english_guide_par75 
_final_rule.pdf. 
13. Kruger, supra note 12, at 11.
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651k (2000) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (2010)).
15. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Steven D. Schell, Self-monitoring and Self-reporting
of Routine Air Pollution Releases, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 107 (1999). 
16. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 13, at 15 n.12.
17. John Schakenbach, Robert Vollaro & Reynaldo Forte, Fundamentals of
Successful Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 
J. OF THE AIR & WASTE M GMT. ASSOCIATION 1576, 1577 (Nov. 2006). These are referred 
to as the Appendix D units, referring to Appendix D of the Part 75 Rules. 
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density.18  The fuel flow rate data are then used together with the results 
of the fuel sampling and analysis to determine the SO2 emission rate.19  
Gas- and oil-fired units that have emissions below a certain threshold are 
considered “low mass emitters” and are not required to continuously 
monitor their emissions.20  Rather, they estimate their hourly SO2 emissions 
using fuel usage data and default emissions factors. 
The rules specify a variety of quality assurance and quality control 
(QA/QC) requirements depending on which monitoring technologies are 
employed.21  For example, there are strict requirements for testing the 
accuracy of the CEMS.  After installing the CEMS, the facility is required 
to conduct certification tests and submit a certification application including 
the test results.22  Once certified, the source is also required to perform 
QA testing on a regular basis using either in-house or contracted expertise.23 
Required QA testing includes daily assessments (e.g., calibration 
error tests), quarterly assessments (e.g., linearity checks), and semi-
annual or annual relative accuracy test audits (RATAs).24 
The regulations require that the facility notify EPA and the state air 
agency when QA testing is taking place so that the government could 
send an observer.25 As an incentive for high accuracy readings, the 
regulations provide for reduced QA testing requirements when favorable 
test results are achieved.26  The rules contain missing data provisions 
(MDPs) that must be applied to estimate emissions when continuous 
monitoring equipment is not functioning or has not passed QA tests.27  
The more data that is missing, the more that the MDPs are designed to 
overestimate actual emissions. This gives sources an incentive to ensure 
that their monitoring equipment is operational and quality assured.28 
The program has featured extensive use of information technology to 
electronically audit the very large volume of emissions data generated 
18. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 29; interview with EPA CAMD
staff, EPA, in D.C. (Sept. 17 2009) (stating that 2-3% of emissions under the program 
are monitored in this way). 
19. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 29.
20. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 43 (§ 75.19); interview with
CAMD staff, EPA, in D.C. (Sept. 17 2009) (stating that less than 1% of emissions under 
the program are monitored in this way). 
21. Cf. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1579.
22. Reitze & Schell, supra note 16, at 118.
23. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583.
24. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 16.
25. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583.
26. Id. at 1577.
27. Id. (explaining that the program’s “missing data provisions” (MDPs) get
progressively more stringent the longer that the monitoring device is inoperative). 
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 80. See also Lesley K. McAllister,
Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and Trade Programs, 24 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 300, 320–21 (2007). 
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under the program.29  Regulated units report hourly emissions and related 
data to EPA four times a year (on a quarterly basis) in a standard electronic 
data reporting format.30 A “designated representative,” generally a facility 
manager, must certify the truth and completeness of all reported data.31 
Using the quarterly reports, EPA can track the quality of the emissions 
data throughout the year as well as the status of emissions as compared 
to the allowances held by each unit.32  EPA has developed software that 
the regulated entities are encouraged to use to prescreen the data for errors.33 
Once EPA computers receive the reports, EPA performs additional 
electronic auditing to verify data accuracy and then notifies the source as 
to whether the quarterly data are acceptable or not.34  Through the electronic 
auditing, the EPA may also determine the need for a field audit or inspection, 
which is generally performed by a state or local environmental agency 
official.35 
Administrative, civil, and criminal penalties may apply for violations. 
If at the end of the compliance year a unit does not have sufficient 
allowances to cover its emissions, an automatic penalty is assessed for 
“excess emissions.”  The penalty was statutorily set in 1990 at $2,000 
per ton of SO2 and is indexed to inflation each year.36  In addition, EPA 
automatically reduces the unit’s cap for the following year by the amount 
exceeded. Civil and criminal penalties are applicable for violations of 
monitoring and reporting rules, and they are also available at the EPA’s 
discretion to supplement the automatic excess emissions penalties.37 
29. Kruger, supra note 12, at 10. See also Reitze & Schell, supra note 16, at 116
(stating that twenty units would generate three to four million data values each year). 
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 86–87.
31. Marjan Peeters, Inspection and Market-based Regulation through Emissions
Trading: The Striking Reliance on Self-monitoring, Self-reporting and Verification, 2 
UTRECHT L. REV. 177, 180 (2006). See also Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1583 
(providing the certification statement language); Reitze & Schell, supra note 30, at 116 
(stating that civil and criminal penalties can be imposed for false statements). 
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 17.
33. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1578; Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note
12, at 4. 
34. Schakenbach et al., supra note 18, at 1578; Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note
12, at 4; Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 52–53. 
35. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 88–89.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651j (1994) (current code at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651j (2010));
Napolitano et al., supra note 4, at 58 n.7. 
37. Napolitano, supra note 3, at 54; Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work:
An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur 
Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 321 (2001). 
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B.  Enforcement Outcomes 
The ARP appears to represent a great success in terms of emissions 
monitoring and enforcement.  Notably, the program has generated a 
complete set of emissions data for the largest SO2 sources in the 
country.38  In contrast, for many environmental regulatory programs, the 
data collected by environmental agencies is insufficient to determine 
actual compliance rates and program effectiveness.39  The ARP has also 
been cited as an example of “cooperative” enforcement.  Interactions 
between the EPA and entities regulated by the program have tended to 
be “relatively harmonious.”40  Finally, the program has reportedly 
required relatively minimal enforcement personnel and resources with its 
heavy reliance on electronic auditing of data rather than physical field 
inspections.41 
Indeed, there have been strikingly few enforcement cases in the ARP, 
either for excess emissions or for monitoring violations.  As shown in 
Table 1, from 1995, the first compliance year, through the 2007 
compliance year, only 23 units out of a universe of about 3,500 that 
participated in the program in one or more years were assessed penalties 
for excess emissions.42  In total, $3,400,614 in penalties for excess emissions 
was collected.  With respect to monitoring, nine sources were assessed a 
total of $589,805 in monetary penalties for monitoring violations from 
1995 through June 2005.43  As described by the EPA, these violations have 
generally stemmed from failures to install and/or operate monitoring 
equipment, or failures to conduct the required testing of monitors or 
report the results.44 
  
 38. Id. at 52. 
 39. Cf. Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire 
Straits: There is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 55, 58–59 (2009). 
 40. Kruger, supra note 12, at 14. See Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing 
“Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 
269, 287 (2007). 
 41. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA430-B-03-002, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO 
DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 4-6 
(2003).  See also McAllister, supra note 42, at 286-87; McAllister, supra note 29, at 321. 
 42. In addition to the automatic sanctions, EPA may also in its discretion assess 
civil or criminal penalties for excess emissions.  An EPA enforcement official explained, 
however, that Acid Rain Program violations are low priority violations for the 
enforcement division because there are not any more environmental gains that can be 
achieved. Interview with EPA staff in D.C. (Sept. 17, 2009). 
 43. McAllister, supra note 29, at 321–22. 
 44. Interview with EPA staff in D.C. (Jan. 6, 2006). 
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TABLE 1: PENALTIES FOR EXCESS EMISSIONS IN THE 














1995 445 0 0 $0 
1996 431 0 0 $0 
1997 423 0 0 $0 
1998 408 0 0 $0 
1999 398 0 0 $0 
2000 2,262 8 70 $187,740 
2001 2,792 9 613 $1,700,462 
2002 3,208 1 33 $94,017 
2003 3,497 1 14 $40,600 
2004 3,391 4 465 $1,377,795 
2005 3,456 0 0 $0 
2006 3,520 0 0 $0 
2007 3,536 0 0 $0 
TO TAL 23 1195 $3,400,614 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT STORY OF RECLAIM
RECLAIM was designed to reduce the sulfur oxide (SOx) and nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) emissions from stationary sources that lead to smog in the 
Los Angeles region. The program began operating in 1994.  In contrast 
to the ARP, the enforcement of RECLAIM has been challenging and 
resource-intensive for its implementing agency, the South Coast Air 
Quality Management District (SCAQMD). While its monitoring and 
reporting rules were very similar to those of the ARP, the enforcement 
needs of RECLAIM turned out to be very different.  To verify compliance, 
SCAQMD found it necessary to conduct comprehensive audits of each 
facility after the end of the compliance year to determine whether the 
emissions reported by the facility were accurate and whether the facility 
had sufficient allowances to cover its emissions. 
9 
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A.  Annual Compliance Audits 
SCAQMD in many ways followed the example of the ARP in designing 
the monitoring rules of RECLAIM.45  A great deal of effort was spent on 
designing a monitoring system that could obtain accurate reports 
of emissions from the sources, and many of the same techniques were 
employed.46 Yet the enforcement system that emerged—verifying the 
reported data through annual compliance audits—was much more labor 
and resource-intensive, and it presented persistent problems for program 
implementation. 
The largest RECLAIM sources (referred to as major sources)47 were 
required to install CEMS and report their emissions on a daily basis.48  
About 15% of the sources installed CEMS, accounting for 84% of total 
NOx emissions and 98% of total SOx emissions.49  Other sources 
must calculate emissions by measuring fuel input and multiplying it 
by an appropriate emission rate.  The CEMS are subject to daily calibration 
checks, routine quality assurance, and a semi-annual RATA.50  Designed 
to take advantage of electronic reporting technology, the program required 
that major sources use a “remote terminal unit” with special software to 
collect the CEMS data, perform calculations, generate the appropriate 
files, and electronically transmit.51 Other sources estimated their emissions 
based on fuel input or operating time, and were required to submit data 
either on a monthly or quarterly basis using either a remote terminal unit 
or manual transmission.52 
All RECLAIM facilities53 are required to submit quarterly emissions 
reports and a final annual emissions report at the end of the compliance 
45. SCAQMD, RECLAIM  VOL. I, DEVELOPMENT REPORT AND RULES EX-1 (1993)
(explaining that SCAQMD developed RECLAIM rules “with the assistance of the 
federal EPA, the California Air Resources Board, and the RECLAIM Steering and 
Advisory Committees.”). 
46. Stranlund et al., supra note 7, at 348–49.
47. There are generally multiple RECLAIM emissions-producing “sources” at a
single RECLAIM “facility.”  In 1996, for example, there were 329 RECLAIM facilities 
and over 4,022 sources.  S. COAST AIR QUALITY M GMT. DIST., RECLAIM  PROGRAM 
THREE-YEAR AUDIT AND PROGRESS REPORT 1998 1-3 tbl.1-1, 5-8 to -9 tbl.5-1 (1998) 
(summing the number of sources categorized as major sources, large sources, and 
process units in tbl.5-1) [hereinafter Three-Year Audit]. 
48. McAllister, supra note 29, at 319.
49. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-8 to -9
50. Over a Dozen Years, supra note 6, at I-2-2 to -3.
51. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5–16.
52. Id.  See also Stranlund et al., supra note 47, at 349 (an estimate of emissions is
attained by multiplying the fuel use or time in operation by an emissions factor, such as x 
emissions/unit fuel, or y emissions/hour of operation). 
53. On the distinction between facility and source in RECLAIM, see supra note
48, at ES-1 to -2. 
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year.54  Submitted emissions reports required “certification for accuracy by 
the highest ranking facility official with responsibility for the subject 
matter of the certification.”55  It was anticipated that, upon receipt of the 
data, SCAQMD would perform “several automated audits, including 
comparing the reported information with a facility’s historic data” to 
determine whether a field inspection was necessary.”56 
Other aspects of the monitoring and reporting rules were also similar 
to the ARP.  RECLAIM rules created incentives for accurate monitoring 
by including punitive MDPs modeled after the ARP’s provisions, as well 
as by allowing more leniency in the calculation of substitute data where 
a CEMS has demonstrated a high level of performance.57   In addition, 
as in the ARP, RECLAIM administrators took “a proactive approach to 
work with the industry to resolve implementation issues” and “conducted 
extensive compliance outreach activities.”58 
However, unlike ARP, the operation of CEMS and information 
technology systems in RECLAIM encountered problems.  Installation 
delays and technical malfunctions were so common in the first few years 
of the program that about twenty percent of the emissions data were 
calculated through the use of the missing data provisions.59  As stated by 
SCAQMD in a report about its first three years of program implementation, 
“the installation and maintenance of CEMS has proved to be a major 
challenge in the RECLAIM program.”60  Many of these problems were 
resolved by the fourth year of the program, and the reliance on data 
generated by application of the missing data provisions accordingly 
decreased.61  The report also stated that there had been problems associated 
with computer programs to automate the process of emissions reporting.62  
54. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (CARB), AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH
COAST AIR QUALITY M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM, V-8 
(Jan.  2000). 
55. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 6, at I-3-15.
56. SCAQMD, supra note 46, at 4–14.
57. McAllister, supra note 29, at 320–21; Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM,
supra note 6, at I-2-3. 
58. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-1.
59. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at I-2-3.
60. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5-1.
61. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at I-2-3 (further showing that
an average of 6.3% of emissions were calculated using missing data provisions in the 
years 1998 through 2005.). 
62. Three-Year Audit, supra note 48, at 5–2.
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Indeed, several years after RECLAIM began, SCAQMD was still trying 
to clarify its rules and requirements relating to electronic reporting.63 
Even with electronic reporting, RECLAIM was unable to implement the 
type of comprehensive electronic auditing used in the ARP.  In a 
retrospective analysis of the program issued in 2007, SCAQMD officials 
explained that the diversity of the types of sources included in RECLAIM 
prevented this.  “The lack of uniformity in the data collected prevented 
the development of an all-encompassing emission calculation tool that 
could be employed facility to facility.”64 With many different types of 
sources, many different types of monitoring and reporting equipment and 
methods had to be used. 
RECLAIM enforcement has required the use of time-consuming and 
resource-intensive audits of each facility after the end of each compliance 
year.  Each audit is conducted by a team of SCAQMD inspectors, includes 
a thorough review of the facility’s records and may take weeks to 
complete.65  To detect violations, the inspectors examine not just the 
physical facility and its RECLAIM-related equipment, but also exhaustively 
review the reports and records required to be kept by each facility under the 
program’s rules.66 
The designers of RECLAIM apparently did not anticipate the need for 
annual compliance audits.  Rather, early program documents stated that 
SCAQMD would inspect facilities and audit emissions records “throughout 
the year,” with no mention of an audit after the year ended.67  In practice, 
however, the agency found that such audits of each facility were necessary 
to verify compliance.68 The audits revealed failures in the CEMS, such as 
computer programming bugs, analyzer failures, and improper daily 
calibration, as well as problems with the fuel meters and timers used to 
calculate emissions using emissions factors.69 The audits also revealed data 
calculation errors and inaccurate records that presumably could not have 
been identified without the audits.70 
63. Id. at 5–17.
64. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at II-2-2.
65. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at I-3-6.
66. Interview with District Prosecutor, S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (June 29,
2010). 
67. SCAQMD, supra note 46, at 4-15, 4-16.
68. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at II-2-2.
69. Cf. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 231, 259–60 (stating “Emission factors are hotly argued among technical 
specialists from different fields and change as new information becomes available. 
Emissions factors are poor surrogates for actual measurements”). 
70. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 5, at II-2-3-II-2-5.
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Unlike the ARP, RECLAIM does not assess automatic penalties for 
emissions that exceed allowance holdings.71 Rather, all types of RECLAIM 
violations are subject to the civil penalties as set forth in state law.  State 
law provides for civil penalties of up to $75,000 per day of violation, but 
SCAQMD must consider a variety of mitigating factors including the 
extent of harm caused by the violation, the nature and persistence of the 
violation, the unproven or innovative nature of the control equipment, any 
action taken by the defendant to mitigate the violation, and the financial 
burden to the defendant.72 As a result, regulators have considerable 
discretion in how they calculate the applicable sanction.  In addition to civil 
penalties, facilities that exceed their caps are also penalized by a 
deduction of the amount of their excess emissions from their cap in the 
following compliance year.73 
B.  Enforcement Outcomes 
Although many aspects of RECLAIM’s monitoring and enforcement 
system were similar to the ARP’s, the outcomes diverged in important 
ways.  Like the ARP, RECLAIM has assembled a very complete and 
reliable set of emissions data for the regulated sources, but the need to 
conduct comprehensive annual audits of each facility has implied a        
high administrative burden on SCAQMD.  As the agency stated in its 
retrospective analysis, “[a]ny program based on mass emissions needs to 
take into account the resource needs for adequate enforcement under this 
new method of measuring compliance.”  In a 2002 review of RECLAIM, 
the EPA concluded that the program demonstrates the possibility that 
compliance and enforcement may require more attention, not less, when 
cap-and-trade regulation replaces traditional command and control 
regulation.74 
 71. Cf. Stranlund et al., supra note 7, at 350. 
 72. See California Health and Safety Code §§ 42,402.3, 42,403 (2009). The 
RECLAIM rules further provide that any emissions “in excess of the allocation shall 
constitute a single, separate violation for each day of the compliance year.” RECLAIM 
Rule 2004(d)(1). The regulated source, however, has an opportunity to demonstrate that 
they were in violation for fewer days. See RECLAIM Rule 2004(d)(2) (placing the 
burden on the Facility Permit holder to establish the lesser period). 
 73. SCAQMD, supra note 46, at EX-15. 
 74. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY 
M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES M ARKET—LESSONS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL M ARKETS AND INNOVATION 30 (2002) [hereinafter EPA Evaluation of 
RECLAIM], available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/reclaim/reclaim-report.pdf (basing 
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The reliance on annual audits to verify compliance also imposed burdens 
on the regulated entities and affected the allowance market.  Because of the 
audit, a facility’s compliance status cannot be fully ascertained until well 
into the following compliance year.75  The audits typically commence 
about two months after the end of the reconciliation period, and are not 
completed until about nine months after the end of the reconciliation 
period.76  In effect, if the reconciliation period lasts three months after 
the end of the compliance year, final compliance determinations will not 
be made for some facilities until near the end of the following compliance 
year.  Over that time, the facility is uncertain as to its compliance for the 
previous year, and will be inclined to hold onto allowances to deal with 
the possibility that it might need them.77 
The burdens of enforcing RECLAIM are evident through analysis of 
the enforcement actions pursued under the program.  The analysis presented 
below shows that enforcement actions were much more common than in 
the ARP, with many hundreds more enforcement actions despite the fact 
that RECLAIM was a much smaller program in terms of how many 
pollution emissions it regulated.  This section describes how the RECLAIM 
enforcement data was collected and analyzed, as well as what the data 
shows about the types of violations, discovery violation and case resolution 
times, and settlement amounts.  The final part of the section makes direct 
comparisons between enforcement actions in RECLAIM and the ARP. 
1. Data and Methods
Data about RECLAIM-related Notices of Violation (NOVs) were 
acquired from SCAQMD through two public information requests and its 
online public information system. SCAQMD issues a NOV to inform a 
regulated company that it is out of compliance with applicable rules, 
permit conditions or other legal requirements.78  A spreadsheet was 
constructed containing all RECLAIM-related NOVs for violations that 
occurred from the beginning of the program in 1994 through the end of 
2006. 
A full listing of the fields in spreadsheet and an explanation of their 
contents are shown in Table 2.  In total, the spreadsheet contained 949 
its conclusions on data collected from November 2001 through January 2002). McAllister, 
supra note 41, at 302–03. 
75. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 6, at III-1-7 (discussing the
“enforcement lag”). 
76. Each audit requires up to several weeks to complete. See id. at I-3-6.
77. McAllister, supra note 41, at 299–300.
78. AQMD Notice, http://www.aqmd.gov/comply/not ices /nov.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2010). 
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NOVs for violations of RECLAIM Rules 2004, 2011, and/or 2012.79  Rule 
2004 is a general rule that requires that RECLAIM facilities be in 
compliance with all permit conditions.80 Excess emissions violations are 
usually recorded as violations of Rule 2004.  Rule 2011 and Rule 2012 
specify the program requirements for monitoring, reporting, and 
recordkeeping of SOx and NOx emissions, respectively. Each NOV 
considered in this analysis is based on a violation of one or more of 
these rules, as well as a possible violation of one or more non-RECLAIM 
rules that also apply to the RECLAIM facility. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the types of dispositions of the 949 
enforcement actions (each NOV is considered to be an “enforcement 
action”) included closed (844); rejected (69); and other (18, including 
cancelled, dismissed, bankruptcy, and compliance only).  The remaining 
18 listed no disposition and are presumed to be pending.  The violation 
description field contained the information that generally allowed a 
classification of the type of violation, as described below in section 
III.B.3.  The settlement amount includes the dollar value of the monetary
penalty imposed on the facility to close the case.  Settlement amount 
values ranged from $150 to $81,012,360. 
79. RECLAIM rules are numbered 2000 through 2020, and are available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/rulesreg.html.  See Three Year Audit, supra note 48. The 
initial spreadsheet included 1309 NOVs, but 360 NOVs were excluded because they 
were marked “VOID” or because they appeared to relate to violations of non-RECLAIM 
rules that occurred at RECLAIM facilities. 
80. As such, command and control requirements that were incorporated into the
RECLAIM permit are cited under Rule 2004 if violated. Email from SCAQMD (Mar. 
30, 2010, 13:38 PST) (on file with author); email from SCAQMD (Apr. 2010). Those 
NOVs that referenced a violation of Rule 2004 but were actually issued for violations of 
non-RECLAIM requirements were not included in the analysis. 
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TABLE 2: SPREADSHEET FIELDS AND EXPLANATIONS 




NOV Number The unique alphanumeric identifier that SCAQMD 
assigns to a Notice of Violation, i.e. P12345. 
Rule Violated Rule 2004, 2011 and/or 2012 (other SCAQMD rules 
may also be listed as violated in the same NOV).  
Name of Facility Generally the name of the company that owns the 
facility.  A single company may own multiple 
RECLAIM facilities.  Each facility is a stationary 
source with NOx or SOx emissions generally greater 




A unique 3 to 6 digit number assigned to each facility. 
Violation Date The date that the violation occurred (often the 
inspector’s best guess or a default date such as the first 
day of the compliance year in which the violation 
occurred).  The spreadsheet includes all NOVs issued 
in RECLAIM with violation dates from 1994 through 
2006. 
Issue Date The date that SCAQMD issued the NOV. 
Violation 
Description 
One or more phrases or sentences that indicate the 
reasons that the NOV was issued.   
Disposition The final status of the NOV: closed, rejected, 
cancelled, dismissed, bankruptcy, or compliance only. 
Disposition Date The date on which SCAQMD determined the 
disposition of the NOV. 
Settlement 
Amount 
The monetary amount for which the NOV was settled; 
only applicable for NOVs with a disposition of 
“closed.”  Many NOVs are settled in combination with 
other NOVs for a single settlement amount. 
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2. Number of Enforcement Actions
A breakdown of the 949 RECLAIM enforcement actions by year of 
the violation date is provided in Figure 2.  The high number of violations 
in 2000 and 2001 is likely to be related to the crisis that the RECLAIM 
program underwent in these years as a result of the California electricity 
crisis.81  In 2000, power-producing facilities in California increased their 
production to respond to the electricity blackouts and concomitantly 
purchased RECLAIM allowances to cover their increased emissions.82  
Allowance prices drastically increased, and the program’s NOx emissions 
exceeded the program cap in the years 2000 and 2001.83 
81. See Paul L. Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POL’Y 365, 379–80 (2001). 
82. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 6, at II-2-7.
83. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ANNUAL RECLAIM  AUDIT 
REPORT FOR 2000 COMPLIANCE YEAR ES-1 to -2 (2002); SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ANNUAL RECLAIM  AUDIT REPORT FOR 2001 COMPLIANCE
YEAR ES-2 (2003). For more description of the electricity crisis and its impact on 
RECLAIM, see McAllister, supra note 29, at 324–27. 
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FIGURE 2: RECLAIM ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY YEAR OF 





















A remarkably high proportion of RECLAIM facilities have been the 
subject of enforcement actions.  In the years 1994 through 2006, the 
RECLAIM universe of regulated facilities included about 330 facilities on 
average.84  Each year, however, slight changes in the RECLAIM universe 
occurred as facilities were newly included in the program; excluded 
from the program because, for example, their emissions fell below the 
threshold; or closed down.  Considering that 345 facilities were in the 
program at the end of the 1994 compliance year (see Table 3, infra) and 
that about 100 facilities were newly included between the years 1995 
through 2006, a total of about 445 facilities participated in the program 
in at least one year of the program.  Of these, 349 facilities (78%) were 
subject to at least one RECLAIM enforcement action.  As shown in Figure 
3, the other 96 had no enforcement actions lodged against them. 
Many facilities had repeat violations, as further shown in Figure 3. 
About half of the facilities (221 out of 445) were subject to two or more 
enforcement actions, while almost one-third of the facilities (135 out of 
445) were subject to three or more enforcement actions. 
84. The program began with 394 facilities but by the end of the first compliance
year, many had been excluded such that 345 facilities participated in 1994 compliance 
year.  In the 1995 through 2006 compliance years, the number of participating facilities 
varied between 354 and 295 (see Table 3, infra). 
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5 or more NOVs
3. Types of Violations
The enforcement actions were analyzed to determine the alleged type 
of violation.  As mentioned above, the violation description field generally 
contains one or more phrases entered by the RECLAIM inspector describing 
the basis for the NOV.  The length, clarity, and specificity of the descriptions 
varied greatly, and some required interpretation or inference to understand.  
The descriptions were ultimately coded into 5 categories: excess emissions; 
late or missing reports; inaccurate reports; lack of installation, maintenance, 
or quality testing of monitoring equipment; and other unspecified violations 
relating to monitoring, reporting or recordkeeping (MRR). 
Figure 4 shows that the most common reason for the issuance of an 
NOV was that the facility had late or missing emissions reports.  Late or 
missing reports was a basis for the NOV in 386 out of 949 (40%) 
enforcement cases.  Such NOVs were issued when the facility failed to 
19 
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  3/14/2016  9:10 AM 
timely submit the required daily, quarterly, or annual reports.85  The second 
most common reason for the issuance of an NOV was that the emissions 
of the facility exceeded its annual allowance holdings in a given year.  This 
reason was given in 356, or 38%, of the NOVs.  Excess emission violations 
are generally penalized in two ways: with a monetary penalty and by 
deducting the amount of emissions that was over the allowance holdings 
from the facility’s allowance holdings for the following compliance year. 
The third most common reason for the issuance of an NOV was that 
the facility failed to install, maintain, or quality test its emissions monitoring 
equipment.  This was alleged in 198, or 21%, of cases.  RECLAIM rules 
2011 and 2012 specify the types of periodic maintenance and quality 
testing that is required once the equipment is installed.  Facilities often 
failed to calibrate equipment, conduct tune-ups, or perform other required 
procedures within the specified period of time.  In 128, or 13%, of the 
enforcement cases, the violation resulted from inaccuracies in the emissions 
reports.  While often the inaccuracy was simply stated rather than detailed, 
some descriptions revealed that the facility had, for example, used an 
incorrect emissions factor, made an erroneous calculation, or misapplied 
the missing data provisions. Finally, in 37, or 4%, of enforcement 
cases, the available information indicated that the NOV was based on 
MRR problems, but the nature of the problem was unspecified. 
In total, 1105 reasons were listed in the 949 NOVs, accounting for the 
fact that the above percentages add up to more than 100%.  Often, for 
example, a single NOV resulted from a combination of inaccurate reports 
and monitoring equipment problems, or from a combination of late or 
missing reports and excess emissions. 
85. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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4. Violation Discovery and Case Resolution Times
The data also allowed calculation of the violation discovery and case 
resolution times for those cases that had been disposed.  As noted above, 
18 of the 949 NOV cases were pending, leaving a group of 931 disposed 
cases.  Of these, 8 had unreliable dates, wherein the listed NOV issue date 
came after the NOV violation date.  For the remaining 923 NOVs, the 
violation discovery time was calculated as the time elapsed between the 
violation date and the issue date.  The violation discovery time averaged 17 
months.  The case resolution time was calculated as the time elapsed 
between the disposition date and the issue date. The case resolution time 
averaged 13 months.  In effect, the average RECLAIM enforcement action 
took 30 months, or 2 and a half years, from the date the underlying 
violation occurred to the date it was closed or otherwise disposed of.  A 
variety of problems in RECLAIM have resulted from this significant 
“enforcement lag.”86 
86. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM, supra note 6, at II-2-6 (using the phrase
“enforcement lag”). See also supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
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The lengthy time required for violation discovery in RECLAIM is 
closely associated with SCAQMD’s reliance on annual audits to verify 
facility emissions.  Such audits cannot start until several months after the 
end of the compliance year, and given the large number of facilities that 
must be inspected and the small number of inspectors, they do not end 
until well into the next compliance year.  It is through this audit that many 
rule violations that occurred during the compliance year are discovered. 
For example, inspectors might conduct an audit for compliance year 
2003 in July 2004, and discover a monitoring equipment testing violation 
that occurred in August 2003.  In this case, inspectors would record the 
violation date as August 2003, and the NOV issue date would be July 
2004, resulting in an 11 month time lapse between the two. 
The average violation discovery time was particularly lengthy for NOVs 
based on excess emissions.  For these, the average violation discovery 
time was about two years (25 months).  For NOVs based only on 
monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping (MRR) violations (including 
late or missing reports, inaccurate reports, monitoring equipment problems, 
and other unspecified MRR violations), the average violation discovery 
time was just under one year.  When both excess emissions and MRR were 
cited as reasons, the average violation discovery time was again close to 
2 years (23 months). 
The particularly lengthy violation discovery time for NOVs based on 
excess emissions can also be explained by SCAQMD’s reliance on annual 
audits.  For these NOVs, the violation date is typically listed as the first 
day of the compliance year for which the facility was found to have 
exceeded its emissions allowance.  For example, inspectors might conduct 
an audit for compliance year 2003 in July 2004, and discover that the 
facility’s 2003 emissions exceeded its allowance holdings.  In this situation, 
inspectors would often record the violation date as January 1, 2003.  
With an NOV issue date in July 2004, the violation discovery time would 
be 19 months. 
At an average of 13 months, case resolution times in RECLAIM were 
also protracted.  A SCAQMD prosecutor explains that case resolution takes 
a lot of time because an NOV goes through several layers of review after 
it is issued.87  The NOV goes first to the issuing inspector’s supervisor 
and manager, who both conduct a detailed examination of it before signing 
off on it. This review often takes 6 months or more due to an existing 
backlog. Then it arrives at the prosecutor’s office, where investigators 
further review the NOV.  Finally it is assigned to one of the agency’s 4 
or 5 prosecutors, who is then responsible for meeting with the violator 
87. Interview with District Prosecutor, S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (June 29,
2010). 
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and negotiating the settlement.  Because RECLAIM violations tend to be 
complex, the prosecutor may have to spend considerable time explaining 
it to the violator and coming to agreement on the amount of the penalty. 
SCAQMD is able to settle almost all its cases and thereby avoid the need 
for litigation to collect penalties. 
5. Settlement Amounts
Settlement amount data were available for the 844 NOVs that resulted 
in a disposition of “closed.”88  SCAQMD often settles multiple pending 
NOVs against a facility in a single settlement.  The 844 NOV were closed 
through 595 settlement agreements, with 595 associated settlement 
amounts.  Also, in some settlements, particularly large ones, RECLAIM- 
related NOVs may be settled together with non-RECLAIM-related NOVs.  
For this reason, for all settlement amounts greater than $50,000, the 
author consulted SCAQMD online public information system to determine 
whether the settlement amount related primarily to RECLAIM-related 
offenses.  Of the 44 settlement amounts greater than $50,000, 16 were 
excluded because the precipitating NOVs were a combination of 
RECLAIM- and non-RECLAIM-related violations, with the majority of 
NOVs being non-RECLAIM-related. The remaining 579 settlement 
amounts form the basis of the analysis below.89 
As apparent from Figure 5, more than half of the settlement amounts 
were for less than $5000, and almost a third were for less than $2000.  In 
contrast, a few very high penalties were assessed for RECLAIM violations, 
including a $17 million dollar penalty against AES Alamitos for excess 
emissions during the California electricity crisis in 2001, and fines of 
about $8 million and $2.5 million for combinations of excess emissions 
88. Settlement amounts are usually paid in cash, but some settlement amounts also
include payment of all or a portion of the settlement amount through a Supplementary 
Environmental Project (SEP).  The SEP may include, for example, pollution-reducing 
capital improvements to the facility that are not required by law or some kind of 
investment for t he healt h benefit  of t he communit y  where t he facility is situated.  
Interview with District Prosecutor, S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (June 29, 2010). In 
a sample of 115 settlement amounts negotiated after July 25, 2006, 10 included SEPs, 
and they constituted on average about 70% of the settlement amount.  Response to 
Public Records Request to South Coast Air Quality Mgmt Dist. (Jun. 25, 2010). 
89. The settlement amounts discussed in this section are overestimates, because it
is likely that some of the settlements under $50,000 are also based in part on non-
RECLAIM violations. However, the author’s experience with the data suggests that the 
large majority of settlements are due primarily or solely to RECLAIM violations. 
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and monitoring violations against American Airlines and Shultz Steel 
respectively.  The median settlement amount was $4,600, the average was 
$59,536, and the total of all settlement amounts was $34,471,112. 
FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS IN





















On average, excess emissions were penalized with significantly higher 
settlement amounts than monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping (MRR) 
violations.  To determine the differences, the 579 settlement agreements 
were classified according to the reasons for the NOVs that they disposed 
of.  If all the RECLAIM-related NOVs disposed of by the settlement 
were for excess emissions, the settlement amount was classified as an 
excess emissions settlement.  If all the NOVs disposed of by the settlement 
were for MRR violations (missing or late reports, inaccurate reports, 
monitoring equipment problems, and/or unspecified MRR problems), the 
settlement amount was classified as an MRR settlement.  Alternatively, 
the settlement might have disposed of NOVs related to both excess 
emissions and MRR.  Figure 6 shows how many settlement amounts fell 
into each of these categories. 
The 79 settlements based on both excess emissions and MRR violations 
averaged $155,074.  The 153 settlements based on only excess emissions 
averaged $129,529.  The 347 settlements based on only MRR violations 
averaged $6,923. 
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FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS JUSTIFIED








6. Comparing RECLAIM to the ARP
To make the quantitative comparison between enforcement outcomes 
in RECLAIM and the ARP clearer, it is helpful to look at their 
enforcement data over comparable times.  Direct comparisons can be 
made for enforcement actions based on both excess emissions and MRR 
violations. 
For the ARP, as presented above, excess emission data were available 
for its first thirteen years, 1995 through 2007.  The data showed that, in 
total, 23 ARP units were penalized for excess emissions, and the total 
penalty amount was about $3.4 million (see Table 1).  Table 3 sets forth 
comparable information for RECLAIM for its first thirteen years, 1994 
though 2006.  In RECLAIM, 316 facilities had excess emissions violations 
in these years, and together they paid about $32 million in penalties.90  It 
is important to note, however, that many of the penalties imposed for excess 
90. There were 316 NOVs (out of 844 NOVs with a status of “closed”) issued in
whole or part because of excess emissions, with the years of the violation date 
distributed as shown in Table 3. In about 10 cases, a single facility had two excess 
emissions NOVs for a given year, but the violation description for most of these 
indicated that the two excess emissions violations actually occurred in different years. 
They were retained in the count because while removing them might have led to more 
accuracy in the annual counts, it would have led to less accuracy in the total count. 
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emissions in RECLAIM were also based on MRR violations.  Of the $32 
million shown in Table 3, about $20 million in penalties were assessed 
on facilities for excess emissions alone and the other $12 million in 
penalties were assessed for a combination of excess emissions and MRR 
violations.91 
TABLE 3: PENALTIES FOR EXCESS EMISSIONS IN RECLAIM, 
















1994 345 0 0 
1995 334 5 $33,400 
1996 329 42 $624,564 
1997 326 10 $78,267 
1998 331 23 $2,795,100 
1999 354 45 $8,813,277 
2000 335 50 $18,181,395 
2001 330 32 $397,774 
2002 332 25 $426,900 
2003 324 28 $208,875 
2004 311 17 $233,417 
2005 304 19 $197,400 
2006 295 20 $89,500 
TOTAL 316 $32,079,869 
In the ARP, as explained above, a total of $589,805 in monetary penalties 
for nine monitoring violations was assessed from 1995 through June 2005.  
In RECLAIM, 375 MRR violation cases had been concluded by June 
2005.92  Penalties for these violations amounted to about $5 million, with 
about $1.5 million in penalties assessed for MRR violations alone and 
91. As discussed above, some of the penalties stated may also be based on non-
RECLAIM violations settled at the same time as the RECLAIM violations. As also 
discussed above, all settlement amounts greater than $50,000 were researched to ensure 
that they were primarily based on RECLAIM; those that were not were excluded from 
the calculation of total penalties per year in Table 2, supra p. 11. 
92. Five hundred and fifty-eight NOVs were closed between 1994 and July 1,
2005.  Three hundred and seventy-five of the NOVs were issued in whole or part for 
MRR violations. One hundred and eighty-three were issued only for excess emissions. 
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the other $3.5 million assessed for a combination of MRR and excess 
emissions violations.93 
The much greater level of enforcement activity in RECLAIM is 
particularly notable because RECLAIM is a significantly smaller program 
in terms of the amount of pollution emissions that it regulates.94  Emissions 
regulated by the ARP each year have been in the millions or tens of 
millions of tons, while emissions regulated by RECLAIM each year 
have been in the thousands or tens of thousands.95  In this sense, RECLAIM 
is less than a hundredth the size of the ARP. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The experience of the ARP is often cited as demonstrating the ease of 
enforcing cap-and-trade regulation.  The experience of RECLAIM provides 
a counterpoint.  Even though RECLAIM regulated far fewer emissions, 
far more enforcement actions were pursued and far more penalties 
were imposed on regulated entities.  RECLAIM further suggests that 
under some conditions, environmental agencies may find cap-and-trade 
programs more difficult and costly to enforce than traditional regulation. 
While this empirical study has focused on quantifying the differences 
in enforcement outcomes in the two programs, data collected also shed 
some light on the reasons for these differences.  With respect to excess 
emissions violations, it is significant that the program caps in RECLAIM 
became very constraining in the year 2000, particularly due to the 
California electricity crisis.  The number of excess emissions violations 
reached its highest point in the lifetime of the program in that year. 
With respect to monitoring violations, it is notable that the ARP included 
a more homogenous set of sources.  The similarity of the sources appears 
to have enabled a greater systematization of data collection, transmission, 
93. The difference between the $3.5 million here and the $12 million above for
penalties assessed for a combination of MRR and excess emissions violations results 
from the fact that the calculation above includes NOVs closed after July 1, 2005 (a set of 
844 NOVs instead of 558 NOVs). 
94. RECLAIM is also a smaller program based on the number of regulated
facilities. In 2009, there were 1,248 ARP facilities. In the latter half of the 2000s, the 
number of RECLAIM facilities has hovered around 300 (see Table 3 supra p. 1).  
However, as described in supra note 48, each RECLAIM facility generally includes 
many sources.  From available information, the number of ARP units (about 3500, see 
Table 1) seems roughly comparable to the number of RECLAIM sources. See supra 
notes 9, 48. 
95. See McAllister, supra note 8, tbl.1, tbl.2.
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and verification.  It is also worth observing that RECLAIM’s enforcement 
approach, namely the use of annual audits, was arguably much 
more exhaustive than the ARP’s system of electronic violation.  While all 
RECLAIM facilities were comprehensively audited, the EPA relied very 
heavily on electronic verification in the ARP and focused its efforts in this 
regard on only the largest sources equipped with CEMS.  The much larger 
number of RECLAIM enforcement actions has likely resulted in part from 
the greater effort expended to discover violations. 
This study clearly shows that the ease of enforcement in cap-and-trade 
cannot be assumed.  Much will depend on how the cap-and-trade program 
is designed, implemented, and enforced.  Given the paramount importance 
of accurate emissions data in cap-and-trade regulation, adequate resources 
must be available to do the enforcement work necessary to ensure that 
violations are discovered and sanctioned. 
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